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Purist Salafism
in France
Salafis are usually qualified as revolu-
tionary or reformist Muslims mainly in-
terested in gaining primacy around the 
world and overthrowing perfidious re-
gimes which have betrayed the cause 
of Islam. However, this image covers 
only one aspect of Salafism, that of the 
Jihadi Salafis, who present themselves 
as partisans of using political violence 
and combating corrupt Muslim leaders. 
External to Jihadi Salafism is a quietist 
Salafism, that of the so-called purists. 
Whereas both types of Salafis reject 
Western society, purist Salafis, unlike Jihadi Salafis, do not strive to de-
stroy it. Neither do purist Salafis in Muslim countries put up resistance 
against the government, even if they find it insufficiently Islamic. 
Whereas the purist view is built around non-political opinions, revo-
lutionary Salafis think that Muslims have a political obligation to estab-
lish a strict Islamic society rid of apostate leaders and to Islamize the 
state and its institutions. Therefore Jihadis target 
Muslim leaders, charged with trampling Islamic 
laws underfoot because of their cooperation 
with the United States and their negligence of 
“their brothers” in Palestine, Afghanistan or Iraq. 
But according to the purist Salafis, human beings 
are created for a strict religious purpose: obeying 
Allah and following His moral and judicial com-
mands. Purists promote a strict religious view 
focusing on the duty to worship Allah who pre-
scribes them obedience to political chiefs so as 
to prevent Muslim communities from fitna (chaos 
and anarchy).1
Purist Islam
For a decade and a half in France, in some sub-
urban areas close to Paris,2 Lille-Roubaix,3 and 
Lyon,4 purist Salafism has become a significant 
social reality within Muslim communities. With 
about 5,000 people said to be purist Salafis in 
France according to Intelligence Services, this 
current is growing in areas traditionally known to 
shelter many Muslim families coming mainly from 
migratory flows after the 1950s-1960s. Generally, 
they are young people and many of them come from Algerian families. 
However, converted people are overrepresented within Salafi groups. 
Within French Muslim communities, converts do not constitute more 
than three or four percent whereas they stand for almost twenty to 
twenty-five percent of the Salafis that I have met through my work. 
They mainly attribute their decision to take up the Minhaj Salafi (Path 
of the Virtuous Ancestors) to the influence of friends who had entered 
Salafi groups.
Cultivating a way of life based on the search for purity, Salafis usually opt 
for a strict break with what they think of as causing their perdition. Practis-
ing moral codes which they identify as coming straight from the salaf (the 
ancestors of early Islam)—thus the best and purest Muslims ever—they 
claim for themselves legitimacy and superiority. Salafis claim to be the 
only Muslims who know the true sense of tawhid (oneness of God) as op-
posed to other currents such as the Muslim Brothers whom they accuse 
of being too far from a true knowledge of the sources.
Moreover, Salafis think they are closer to Islamic authenticity and 
truth because their methodology is based on the primacy of ortho-
dox scholars. They appeal to Salafi scholars—teaching mainly in Saudi 
Arabia—for religious rulings because 
they have mastered Islamic learning 
and answer any question supporting it 
with proof. Put differently, Salafi Islam 
presents itself as rational compared to 
“passionate Islam.” Such was the claim 
made by a young Salafi to distinguish 
“his” Islam from l’Islam de France repre-
sented by famous figures such as Tariq 
Ramadan. Legitimacy based on the ex-
pertise of judicial norms seems to be 
the key to understanding the feeling 
of Islamic superiority associated with 
Salafi Islam. In France, where Islam is a much stigmatized religion, it 
can be easily understood why some people overturn this stigmata by 
insisting on their exceptional predestination. The Minhaj Salafi as it is 
understood in France grants answers to young people facing anomie 
and trying to position themselves within the French context.
Breaking with society
When we observe “the Salafi way of life” from the period of its emer-
gence we see that from their clothing to their cultural habits every-
thing is related to the desire to break with the surrounding society. For 
instance, whereas many young Muslims (many young people living in 
the suburbs, actually) prefer wearing suits because of their profes-
sional life or others wear sporting caps, Salafis wear the qamis, a long 
tunic over loose pants, their heads are covered by a taqiyya, and they 
wear izhar (shorter pants that end before the ankles). Their dress aims 
at stating at an immediate glance that they do not belong to modern 
times.
Before conversion many Salafis lived an un-Islamic life including 
the consumption of alcohol and sexual promiscuity, after which they 
started looking for an ideal provided by Islamic purity. Maybe for this 
reason they act as if they do not want to stay connected with their 
former environment. This can also be an explanation for their refusal 
to participate in politics within French society. For example, almost all 
the purist Salafis I met claimed they do not vote on religious grounds. 
However, it turned out that most of them have never voted for their 
whole life, even before becoming Salafis. Consequently, this can ex-
plain Salafis’ weak involvement in political issues.
Moreover, since purist Salafis do not identify with French social 
customs, and more generally with Western moral codes, they tend to 
leave France to join Muslim countries where they believe they will 
be able to practise true Islam and experience real religious freedom. 
They call this a hijra (salutary migration), or a “return to the lands of 
origins” (from where their parents should never have left). However, 
though until a few years ago, main destinations were the countries of 
their parents, currently, through a process of “globalization of hijra” 
new geographical targets such as Dubai or Abu Dhabi can be men-
tioned.
Whereas France stops being their country and they get a new iden-
tity based strictly on a religious feeling of belongingness, it must be 
stressed that the hijra made by French Salafis obeys a Western logic. 
For example, they are attracted by modern and dynamic trading cit-
ies which enable them to set up businesses and become wealthy. 
Instead of reaffirming their parental culture by returning to Algeria 
or Morocco for instance, they are more akin to the globalized youth 
involved in computer or electronic goods businesses who travel fre-
quently between Europe and the Gulf so as to advance their personal 
situations. By learning foreign languages (mostly English) and con-
necting to new ways of lives, they improve their cultural skills and 
their knowledge of the world.
Although Islam in France is composed of 
currents found in Muslim societies around the 
world, France is currently primarily affected 
by the assertion of purist Salafis, whose main 
concern is to bring Muslim believers back to the 
path of Islamic orthodoxy. Purist Salafi Muslims 
strictly differentiate themselves from non-
Muslims and Muslims alike. They emphasize a 
break with society in order to return to Islam 
practiced in its “original” form, but their purist 
Salafism nonetheless retains some trappings of 
the modernity it shuns.
Before conversion 
many Salafis lived 
an un-Islamic 
life including the 
consumption of 
alcohol and sexual 
promiscuity…
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Intra-religious competition
Salafi imams play hardly any role in 
the turn to Salafism in France. Most of 
the time, when we study the Salafis’ 
trajectories, we are led to traces of the 
Tablighi Jamaat, or more rarely, instances 
of attending conferences of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. They come to the da‘wa 
salafiyya (Salafi mission) through their 
disappointment with these forms of 
Islam which they later see as “false.” Sala-
fis justify their negative view of the Mus-
lim “other” by referring to the magical el-
ements they find in Tablighi Islam or the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s taste for accom-
modation and politics. For example, they 
call the Islam of Muslim Brotherhood 
“Islam light” and claim that the ikhwan 
muslimin (Muslim Brothers) are, in fact, 
ikhwan muflissin (Corrupt Brothers) who 
have given too much value to politics. 
Purists level similar criticism at Jihadis, 
adding political violence to the list.
Purist Salafi groups in main suburban areas in France consider them-
selves the cream of Islam. They feel they do not belong to oppressed 
social classes because they have joined a kind of sacred caste that is 
the elite of society. Allah chose them to be the taifa al-mansura (victori-
ous branch) and the farqat al-najiya (saved group), in reference to the 
famous and much debated hadith that Muslims will divide into seventy 
three factions all of which will end in hell except for the one Allah saves 
because it had stayed faithful in the face of temptations. Many Salafis 
think they form that only group destined for eternal salvation, because 
they have resisted the allure of “new” gods such as money, democracy, 
or secularism. Having been saved, they have to be grateful toward Allah 
and obey His Laws. This exclusive feeling is very different from Muslim 
currents such as the Muslim Brotherhood which insists on the need to 
unify Muslims and to come to an agreement with all of them so that 
Islam and Muslims restore their glory.
On a cultural and social level, purist Salafism can be defined as an 
attempt to rationalize time and space. Life, work, and education are 
fields for religious investment. However, there is a real contradiction in 
French Salafis’ way of life and their desire to be recognized as the pos-
sessors of Islamic truth. While Salafis intend to live apart from the rest of 
the society on religious grounds they are also involved in a competition 
with other Muslims. The Islamic field in France can thus be described 
as a market within which each “firm”; each Muslim current, emphasizes 
comparative advantages to win “religious market shares.”
Salafis emphasize authenticity as opposed to, for instance, Muslim 
Brotherhood’s Islam as seen in the Union des Organisations Islamiques 
de France (UIOF), which prioritizes the need for a contextualized Islam 
that will allow one to be fully Muslim and fully citizen at the same time. 
Understandably, purist Salafism is overwhelmingly popular for a major-
ity of young Muslims who do not succeed at school and are above all 
mistrustful of the surrounding society. Muslim youth who are attracted 
by the message of UOIF for example are seeking social enhancement 
which leads them to look for a religious discourse that legitimizes their 
choices. In other words, contextualizing Islam does not lead to integra-
tion but integration leads to reformulating religious imperatives.
Negotiated identities
Escaping professional careers that might corrupt them, Salafis are 
often led to establish their own businesses such as fast-food restau-
rants, phone shops, Internet cafes, and bookshops. Ironically, many 
Salafi entrepreneurs reach social positions thanks to their successful 
businesses. Attributing their social ascension to the correctness of their 
religious orientation they take their worldly success as a further sign of 
their religious superiority. Briefly, many Salafis change from a “down 
and outs” state to a “chosen ones” state and they see Islam as the cause 
of their progress: true Islam has empowered them.
Furthermore, instead of keeping Salafis separate from the rest of the 
non-Muslim community, this counterculture contributes to a kind of 
integration between Salafis and others. This integration is based on 
purist Salafi wishes to hold on to many attractive features of Western 
modernity such as its business spirit or consumer culture. Thus purist 
Salafism engenders a “negotiated identity” which allows its adherents 
to appear as more honourable believers while retaining the undeni-
able advantages that French nationality provides. They do not consider 
themselves as citizens but as people whose bond with the state is not 
allegiance but utility. Though they abstain from political participation 
in a non-Islamic state, Salafis have no scruples in taking welfare from 
that very state. No Salafi has ever admitted that accepting welfare is 
prohibited and none of the several Salafi websites I have seen discuss 
the prohibition of receiving social help from the non-Muslim state.
French purist Salafism appears to be a manifestation of post-Islamism 
since it can be defined as the plan to foster Islamic militancy without 
using real political means as creating parties or involvement in elec-
tions and political campaigns. Its main characteristic is the will to “re-
Islamize” Muslims by reinvesting in the “core business” of Islam, namely 
tawhid, worship, and spirituality. In their view, Islamists have not been 
of real service to the ummah since their actions have only created fitna. 
Contrary to Islamists who generally want to get political power either 
violently or legally, purist Salafi thinking insists on using non-political 
methods.
The purists focus on purely religious elements such as faith and ado-
ration. Society has to be “re-Islamized” by means of preaching and pro-
viding “a good model.” The institutions however have to be Islamized 
through inspired scholars who are able to reform the state thanks to 
their religious knowledge. “Ordinary” believers have to stay away from 
theses struggles and focus on preaching, worshipping, and deepening 
their knowledge of religion, because they can easily lose their self-con-
trol.
No longer down and outs, purist Salafis set up some kind of new 
“bourgeoisie” whose goal is to maintain a “top culture” which will reach 
any Muslim or even any person on earth. Purist 
Salafis believe they form the avant garde and will 
become moral models for anyone. They are to be 
the followed ones and not the followers. Thus, 
it seems justified to speak of purist Salafism in 
France as a religious answer to social, symbolic, 
and cultural feelings of domination that are wide-
spread among Muslim populations. This discourse 
of true Islam can be used to reformulate power re-
lations to the advantage of the dominated. 
Notes
1. During French elections, Salafis reprimanded 
Muslims planning to vote. Quarrels erupted 
in mosques between elderly Muslims who 
urged the young to vote, and Salafis, who 
declared that it was illicit to take part in 
non-Islamic institutions. I witnessed an old 
man quoting Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi as 
allowing political participation, after which 
a Salafi retorted that Salafis did not heed 
deviant scholars.
2. In Les Mureaux, Stains, Argenteuil, Nanterre, 
and Épinay-sur-Seine.
3. In Roubaix and Tourcoing.
4. In Vénissieux.
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